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WHO PUT THE QUO IN QUID PRO QUO?:
WHY COURTS SHOULD APPLY MCDONNELL’S
“OFFICIAL ACT” DEFINITION NARROWLY
Adam F. Minchew*
Federal prosecutors have several tools at their disposal to bring criminal
charges against state and local officials for their engagement in corrupt
activity. Section 666 federal funds bribery and § 1951 Hobbs Act extortion,
two such statuary tools, have coexisted for the past thirty-six years, during
which time § 666 has seen an increasing share of total prosecutions while
the Hobbs Act’s share of prosecutions has fallen commensurately.
In the summer of 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court decided McDonnell v.
United States—a decision that threatens to quicken the demise of Hobbs Act
extortion in favor of § 666. If McDonnell is interpreted to apply to Hobbs
Act extortion but not to § 666, we can expect the latter to become the
unchallenged favorite of federal prosecutors as well as increased litigation
over whether § 666 bribery contains a quid pro quo requirement. This is
likely to occur given § 666’s coverage of the same corrupt behavior,
expansive jurisdictional hook, and, following McDonnell, lower difficulty of
proving violations within some circuits. To avoid this eventuality, lower
courts should distinguish McDonnell because of its unique procedural
posture and continue to apply the existing quid pro quo framework. Before
meaningful change to our federal bribery statutes can take place, the courts
of appeals must first find consensus over whether and when § 666 requires
the government to prove the existence of a quid pro quo.
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INTRODUCTION
From 2009 to 2012, Virginia Governor Robert McDonnell accepted over
$175,000 in gifts and loans from Jonnie Williams, the CEO of a Virginiabased nutritional supplement company.1 At the same time, Williams sought
state-sponsored research of a new product.2 Federal prosecutors charged
McDonnell, and a jury found him guilty of honest services fraud and Hobbs
Act extortion under color of official right.3 On June 27, 2016, however, a
unanimous U.S. Supreme Court vacated McDonnell’s conviction and
remanded due to an erroneous jury instruction regarding the meaning of
“official act”—the quo component of a quid pro quo.4 On September 8,
2016, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Virginia moved
to dismiss the indictment with prejudice.5
In analyzing the district court’s jury instruction, the Court in McDonnell
v. United States6 considered the elements of Hobbs Act extortion7 and
honest services fraud8 with reference to the federal bribery statute’s9
definition of “official act.”10 It held that an official act must be a specific,
formal exercise of government power rather than some undefined future
benefit.11
Law-abiding, tax-paying citizens have long demanded that public
officials be held to the same (or higher) standards as themselves. Indeed,
among Congress’s first acts after the founding was to outlaw bribery of
customs officers and federal judges.12
Today, there exists a patchwork of federal bribery statutes with
overlapping criminal conduct, applicable individuals, and jurisdictional
elements.13 Despite their differences, the primary purpose of these statutes
is the same: to render unlawful certain self-interested behaviors by state,
federal, and local public officials and private individuals who receive
federal funding.14 These statutes principally target the use of official
government power for personal pecuniary gain, whether through bribery,
kickbacks, extortion, or defrauding the public of honest services.15
Determining the line between distasteful behavior and criminal behavior,

1. See McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2361 (2016).
2. See id.
3. See id. at 2364–67.
4. Id. at 2375.
5. Unopposed Motion to Remand for Dismissal, McDonnell v. United States, No. 154019 (4th Cir. Sept. 8, 2016).
6. 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016).
7. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2012).
8. Id. §§ 1343, 1346.
9. Id. § 201.
10. See McDonnell, 136 S. Ct at 2365.
11. Id. at 2372.
12. See PETER J. HENNING & LEE J. RADEK, THE PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF PUBLIC
CORRUPTION: THE LAW AND LEGAL STRATEGIES 3–4 (2011).
13. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 201, 1346, 1951–52.
14. See id.
15. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 666, 1346, 1951.

1796

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85

however, has confounded prosecutors, citizens, legislators, and the courts
for years.16
This Note explores the possible effects that McDonnell will have on the
quid pro quo standard for future federal prosecutions of state and local
official corruption.17 Quid pro quo, as interpreted and defined by the
Supreme Court, generally means “a specific intent to give or receive
something of value in exchange for an official act.”18 Stated simply, the
quid is the thing of value, the quo is the official act, and the pro is the
contemplated exchange.19 A narrow construction of any component of the
quid pro quo will limit the range of conduct criminalized by bribery statutes
requiring such proof. This Note focuses almost exclusively on the nature of
the quo (i.e., the official act) and differing standards of “official act” that
courts have developed for specific statutes and circumstances.
Part I presents the two federal statutes that are the focus of this Note:
§ 666 federal funds bribery20 and § 1951 Hobbs Act extortion under color
of official right.21 Although Congress enacted each statute independently,
both criminalize virtually the same conduct.22 Section 666 prohibits the
corrupt solicitation, demand, acceptance, or agreement to accept anything
valued $5,000 or greater while intending to be influenced or rewarded in
connection with any business of a government body or agency that receives
$10,000 or greater in federal funds.23 Hobbs Act extortion under color of
official right prohibits the receipt of a payment to which the recipient is not
entitled in exchange for an agreement to perform an official act.24
Although the criminalized conduct is substantially the same, the lower
courts have developed divergent standards of proof, creating critical
differences, which McDonnell brings into stark contrast.
Part II briefly describes the birth and early life of Hobbs Act extortion.
This part also discusses the Supreme Court’s establishment of “official
acts” as the quo component of the quid pro quo framework developed in
two early 1990s cases, McCormick v. United States25 and Evans v. United
States.26 Part II.C then details the circuit court confusion over the quid pro
quo requirement for Hobbs Act extortion following the Supreme Court’s
decisions in McCormick and Evans, specifically the “explicit” and
“implicit” quid pro quo requirements and when each is appropriate.
16. See infra Parts II.C, III.
17. The federal bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201, is not the direct focus of this Note,
because its quid pro quo standard is settled and its existence does not implicate the same
federalism and vagueness concerns as § 1951 Hobbs Act extortion and § 666 federal funds
bribery.
18. United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398, 404–05 (1999).
19. Id. at 404.
20. 18 U.S.C. § 666.
21. Id. § 1951. Honest services wire fraud, the other theory of bribery that Governor
McDonnell was alleged to have committed, falls outside the scope of this Note.
22. See infra Part I.C.
23. 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B), (b).
24. See id. § 1951; Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 268 (1992).
25. 500 U.S. 257 (1991).
26. 504 U.S. 255 (1992).
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Part III follows up the discussion of quid pro quo under Hobbs Act
extortion with a discussion of quid pro quo as applied to prosecutions under
§ 666. Specifically, this part explores the current circuit split over whether
the text of § 666 required proof of a quid pro quo at all. Although the
prosecution did not charge McDonnell with violating § 666,27 and the
Court’s opinion does not discuss it,28 understanding how the courts of
appeals interpret the quid pro quo requirement, or lack thereof, is crucial to
understanding the potential reach of McDonnell.
With an understanding of the pre-McDonnell quid pro quo requirements
for Hobbs Act extortion, Part IV introduces the underlying facts, procedural
history, and analysis used by the Supreme Court in McDonnell.
In Part V, this Note presents the range of possible interpretations of
McDonnell by the lower courts. On one end of the spectrum, McDonnell
can read narrowly as applying only to § 201 federal bribery and not to
Another reasonable interpretation is that
Hobbs Act extortion.29
McDonnell’s “official act” definition applies to Hobbs Act extortion but not
to § 666.30 On the other end of the spectrum, McDonnell can be read
broadly as requiring a heightened definition of “official act” that applies
equally to all federal antibribery statutes, including § 666.31
Finally, in Part VI, this Note takes the position that the lower courts
should distinguish McDonnell on its facts and procedural history to give the
Supreme Court time to clarify the quid pro quo standard, if any, applicable
to § 666. Despite the Court’s concerns that a weaker standard raises
regarding fair notice, federalism, due process, and overzealous prosecution,
the danger and likelihood that McDonnell is applied to Hobbs Act extortion
but not to § 666 is a more pernicious long-term problem. Application of a
specific official act requirement to Hobbs Act extortion but not to § 666
would result in two statutes that criminalize the same conduct but have
substantively different required elements—a result that neither Congress
nor the Supreme Court could have intended. Such a result would
necessarily demote Hobbs Act extortion and promote § 666, as prosecutors
would be given an obvious advantage in § 666 prosecutions.
I. STATUTORY BACKGROUND
OF FEDERAL EXTORTION AND BRIBERY
To understand the impact of McDonnell on federal prosecution of state
and local official corruption, it is necessary to understand the statutory
underpinnings of § 1951 Hobbs Act extortion under color of official right32
and § 666 federal funds bribery.33
27. See generally Indictment, United States v. McDonnell, 64 F. Supp. 3d 783 (E.D. Va.
2014) (No. 3:14-CR-00012-JRS), 2014 WL 223601.
28. See generally McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct 2355 (2016).
29. See infra Part V.C.
30. See infra Part V.B.
31. See infra Part V.A.
32. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), (b)(2) (2012).
33. Id. § 666.
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A. Hobbs Act Extortion: 18 U.S.C. § 1951
Congress enacted § 1951, colloquially known as the Hobbs Act34 (“the
Act”) in honor of its sponsor, Alabama Senator Sam Hobbs, in 1946 in an
effort to control racketeering.35 As implied by its statutory title—
“Interference with Commerce by Threats or Violence”—Congress passed
the Hobbs Act to prohibit interference with interstate commerce by either
robbery or extortion involving the use or threatened use of force.36 As
Senator Hobbs noted, the common law meaning of extortion was well
understood at the time of the Act’s passage; it had been “construed a
thousand times by the courts.”37 Nevertheless, the Act specifically defines
“extortion” as “the obtaining of property from another, with his consent,
induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or
under color of official right.”38 The Act carries a statutory maximum
twenty-year prison sentence.39
In the 1960s, prosecutors began trying to extend the Hobbs Act’s
definition of extortion not only to racketeering involving physical threats
and violence but also to the solicitation and acceptance of bribes by public
officials.40 Courts initially rejected the notion that officials were guilty of
extortion under color of official right when the payor’s actions were willful
and voluntary, as in traditional bribery.41
Beginning in 1972, however, coinciding with public outcry over official
corruption in the aftermath of the Watergate scandal,42 Hobbs Act extortion
under color of official right went from being ignored to transforming into
federal prosecutors’ preferred tool for charging local officials with
corruption.43 Federal prosecutors in New Jersey successfully employed
Hobbs Act extortion to prosecute public corruption for the first time in

34. Ch. 537, 60 Stat. 420 (1946) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1951).
35. See Jeremy N. Gayed, “Corruptly”: Why Corrupt State of Mind Is an Essential
Element for Hobbs Act Extortion Under Color of Official Right, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1731, 1752 (2003); see also Peter J. Henning, Federalism and the Federal Prosecution of
State and Local Corruption, 92 KY. L.J. 75, 128–29 (2003); Francis N. MacDonald, Federal
Jurisdiction and the Hobbs Act: United States v. Stillo and the Depletion of Assets Theory,
72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1389, 1393 (1997).
36. 18 U.S.C. § 1951.
37. MacDonald, supra note 35, at 1393 n.18.
38. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2).
39. Id. § 1951(a).
40. See McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 277 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
41. See id. at 277–78; see also United States v. Addonizio, 451 F.2d 49, 72 (3d Cir.
1971); United States v. Kubacki, 237 F. Supp. 638, 641 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
42. See Geraldine Szott Moohr, Mail Fraud and the Intangible Rights Doctrine:
Someone to Watch over Us, 31 HARV. J. LEGIS. 153, 164 n.40 (1994).
43. See Henning, supra note 35, at 130–31; see also Evans v. United States, 504 U.S.
255, 290 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Hobbs Act serves “as the engine
for a stunning expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction into a field traditionally policed by
state and local laws—acts of public corruption by state and local officials”); Jan Hoth Uzzo,
Federal Prosecution of Local Political Corruption Under the Hobbs Act: The Second
Circuit Attempts to Define Inducement, 51 BROOK. L. REV. 734, 736 (1985).
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United States v. Kenny.44 The Third Circuit accepted the prosecution’s
theory of extortion under color of official right as “the wrongful taking by a
public officer of money not due him or his office, whether or not the taking
was accomplished by force, threats or use of fear.”45 The prosecution,
district court, and Third Circuit on appeal relied on a disjunctive reading of
the statute, in which “under color of official right” is construed as being
disconnected from the preceding language—“force, violence, or fear.”46 At
the time it was first used in Kenny, Hobbs Act extortion under color of
official right had no specific quid pro quo requirement and carried a
maximum penalty of twenty years.47 Thus, the stage was set for the rise of
a statute that, since 1984, has served as the lead charge in 1,629 federal
prosecutions of state and local official corruption—more than 20 percent of
all federal prosecutions of such conduct by state and local officials.48
B. Federal Funds Bribery: 18 U.S.C. § 666
Congress enacted the Federal Funds Bribery and Theft Act in 198449 in
anticipation of a pending Supreme Court case addressing whether the thenexisting federal bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201, applied to state and local
officials.50 Unlike the Hobbs Act, which derives its federal jurisdiction
from the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause of the
Constitution,51 federal jurisdiction under § 666 is grounded in the Spending
Clause.52 The statute sweeps broadly to cover all local officials whose
departments receive $10,000 or more in federal funds;53 the Supreme Court

44. 462 F.2d 1205 (3d Cir. 1972); see also id. at 1229; JOHN T. NOONAN, BRIBES 586
(1984) (“Kenny . . . amend[ed] the Hobbs Act and [brought] into existence a new crime—
local bribery affecting interstate commerce. Hereafter, for purposes of Hobbs Act
prosecutions, such bribery was to be called extortion. The federal policing of state
corruption had begun.”).
45. Kenny, 462 F.2d at 1229.
46. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (1970)); see also McCormick, 500 U.S. at 266 &
n.5. One commentator has described this as the moment where the federal bribery statute
and Hobbs Act extortion under color of official right began to merge. See John S. Gawey,
The Hobbs Leviathan: The Dangerous Breadth of the Hobbs Act and Other Corruption
Statutes, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 383, 398 (2011).
47. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2012); see Lee J. Radek, Hobbs Act, in PROSECUTION OF PUBLIC
CORRUPTION CASES 413, 419–20 (1988), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/
110010-110033NCJRS.pdf (stating that Hobbs Act extortion “punishes activity with a 20year maximum sentence which, if engaged in by Federal officials and prosecuted under 18
U.S.C. § 201, would be punishable by fifteen years for bribery or two years for gratuity”)
[https://perma.cc/U5QN-CJJL].
48. Adam Minchew, Corruption Prosecution Data Compilation from Tracfed.com (Nov.
2, 2016) (on file with the Fordham Law Review) (compiling all federal § 666 and Hobbs Act
bribery prosecutions from 1986 to 2016).
49. Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1104, 98 Stat. 1837 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 666).
50. See Justin Weitz, The Devil Is in the Details: 18 U.S.C. § 666 After Skilling v.
United States, 14 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 805, 816 (2011).
51. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
52. See Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 605 (2004).
53. 18 U.S.C. § 666(b).
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has held that “[n]o connection whatsoever between the corrupt transaction
and the federal benefits need be shown.”54
The statute’s prohibitions reach any “agent of an organization, or of a
State, local, or Indian tribal government, or any agency thereof.”55
Moreover, § 666 expressly criminalizes both the offer and acceptance of a
bribe.56 The text of the statute contains no quid pro quo requirement nor
does it contain the phrase “official act.”57 With respect to the recipient of a
bribe, the statute provides:
Whoever . . . corruptly solicits or demands for the benefit of any person,
or accepts or agrees to accept, anything of value from any person,
intending to be influenced or rewarded in connection with any business,
transaction, or series of transactions of such organization, government, or
agency involving anything of value of $5,000 or more; . . . shall be fined
under this title, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.58

C. Contrasting § 666 and Hobbs Act Extortion
Whereas the courts developed the Hobbs Act theory of bribery over time
based on policy and reference to the common law,59 § 666 is unmistakably
the will of Congress and is undergirded by a detailed statutory framework
less subject to judicial interpretation.60 Despite their differences, the two
statutes criminalize substantially the same conduct.61 Indeed, the Supreme
Court in Evans noted that Hobbs Act extortion under color of official right
is the “rough equivalent of what we would now describe as ‘taking a
bribe.’”62 One commenter has added that the conduct criminalized by
§ 666 in 1984, at least with respect to public officials, was “more than
adequately covered by official right extortion under the Hobbs Act.”63
Until recently, an important difference between Hobbs Act extortion
under color of official right and § 666 bribery was the ability of prosecutors
to charge the bribe payor—in addition to the official accepting the bribe—
under § 666 but not under the Hobbs Act. In the summer of 2016, the
Supreme Court resolved a circuit split on this issue. Decided just months
before McDonnell, the Court in Ocasio v. United States64 reaffirmed that
Hobbs Act extortion under color of official right embodies common law
extortion and includes the “rough equivalent of what we would now

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Sabri, 541 U.S. at 613.
18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1).
Id. § 666(a)(1)–(2).
See id.
Id. § 666(a)(1)(B).
See Gawey, supra note 46, at 405.
See 18 U.S.C. § 666.
See H. Marshall Jarrett, Charging Decisions, in PROSECUTION OF PUBLIC
CORRUPTION CASES, supra note 47, at 209, 213 (“A violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666 can be
charged in conjunction with the Hobbs Act if the jurisdictional requirement of receipt of a
specified amount of Federal funds by the official’s employer is met.”).
62. Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 260 (1992).
63. See Gawey, supra note 46, at 410.
64. 136 S. Ct. 1423 (2016).
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describe as ‘taking a bribe.’”65 The petitioner specifically argued that
permitting conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act extortion is “tantamount to a
charge of soliciting or accepting a bribe and that allowing such a charge
undermines 18 U.S.C. § 666.”66 The Court, however, could find “no
principled basis for precluding the prosecution of conspirac[y] to commit”
Hobbs Act extortion while conspiracy to commit bribery under existing
federal statutes was permitted.67 It thus held that a civilian bribe payor—
not just the bribed official—could be prosecuted under the Hobbs Act and
convicted of conspiracy to commit extortion “under color of official
right.”68
Justice Thomas, however, alluded in his dissent that Evans was wrongly
decided.69 He asserted that the majority’s opinion “blurr[ed] the distinction
between bribery and extortion.”70 Thus, in holding that bribe payors are
subject to prosecution under Hobbs Act extortion, Ocasio eroded a central
distinction between Hobbs Act extortion and § 666 federal bribery.
The remaining difference between the two statutes is the difficulty of
proving a violation. Whereas the Supreme Court has established and
interpreted the quid pro quo framework for Hobbs Act extortion with a
degree of clarity and consensus,71 neither Congress nor the Supreme Court
has explicitly addressed whether proof of a quid pro quo is necessary in
§ 666 prosecutions.72 The required showing of a promised or performed
“official act”73 in the former and the “corrupt solicitation” of a “reward[] in
connection with any business, transaction, or series of transactions”74 in the
latter is crucial. Because “official act” has taken on a very specific
meaning, § 666’s lack of the term is of unique importance.75
II. HOBBS ACT EXTORTION: QUID PRO QUO?
In the aftermath of Kenny, the courts of appeals largely adopted the Third
Circuit’s “wrongful taking” framework.76 A majority of them, including
65. Id. at 1428 (quoting Evans, 504 U.S. at 260).
66. Id. at 1434.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1436.
69. Id. at 1439 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that the Court’s interpretation has
“wrenche[d] from the States the presumptive control that they should have over their own
officials’ wrongdoing”).
70. Id.
71. See infra Part II.A–B.
72. See infra Part III.B–C.
73. See infra Part II.B.
74. 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B) (2012).
75. Another important difference between the two statutes is their applicability.
Whereas only those who hold public office can be prosecuted under Hobbs Act extortion,
prosecutors can employ § 666 to charge private citizens if their organization or business
receives the statutorily required $10,000 in federal funds. See id. § 666(b). For the purposes
of this Note, which focuses on federal prosecution of state and local government corruption,
however, this difference is of little importance.
76. See Lauren Garcia, Note, Curbing Corruption or Campaign Contributions?: The
Ambiguous Prosecution of “Implicit” Quid Pro Quos Under the Federal Funds Bribery
Statute, 65 RUTGERS L. REV. 229, 234 n.35 (2012) (citing United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d
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the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Evans,77 ruled that Hobbs Act
extortion under color of official right is “consonant with the common law
definition of extortion” and, therefore, “[t]he coercive element [of the
crime] is supplied by the existence of the public office itself.”78 Thus, the
Eleventh Circuit held that “passive acceptance of a benefit by a public
official is sufficient to form the basis of a Hobbs Act violation.”79 The
Second Circuit, however, strayed from the majority position by reading the
language of the Hobbs Act more narrowly to require
“induce[ment] . . . under color of official right”—a criminal wrong
“begin[ning] with the public official, not with the gratuitous actions of
another.”80 Soon after, the Ninth Circuit employed a similar statutory
construction and joined the Second Circuit in establishing a heightened
inducement standard.81 This conflict over inducement led to back-to-back
decisions in the early 1990s, which redefined Hobbs Act extortion.
A. McCormick v. United States: Is Proof of a Quid Pro Quo
Necessary for Hobbs Act Extortion Convictions?
In the 1991 case of McCormick v. United States,82 the Supreme Court
issued its first major opinion concerning Hobbs Act extortion under color of
official right. Although the Court declined to resolve the circuit split
regarding whether a federal prosecutor must prove some affirmative act of
inducement by an official,83 it did resolve the threshold question of whether
and when proof of a quid pro quo is a required element of Hobbs Act
extortion.84
Robert McCormick, a West Virginia state legislator, sponsored a bill
permitting doctors with foreign medical degrees to temporarily practice
578, 595 (3d Cir. 1982) (en banc); United States v. French, 628 F.2d 1069, 1074 (8th Cir.
1980); United States v. Williams, 621 F.2d 123, 124 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Butler,
618 F.2d 411, 418 (6th Cir. 1980); United States v. Hall, 536 F.2d 313, 320–21 (10th Cir.
1976); United States v. Hathaway, 534 F.2d 386, 393 (1st Cir. 1976)).
77. 910 F.2d 790 (11th Cir. 1990), aff’d, 504 U.S. 255 (1992).
78. Id. at 796 (quoting Williams, 621 F.2d at 124); see also United States v. Garner, 837
F.2d 1404, 1423 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Spitler, 800 F.2d 1267, 1274–75 (4th Cir.
1986).
79. Evans, 910 F.2d at 796 (stating that the official must know “that he is being offered
the payment in exchange for a specific requested exercise of his official power . . . [and]
need not take any specific action to induce the offering of the benefit”).
80. United States v. O’Grady, 742 F.2d 682, 686–87, 691 (2d Cir. 1984) (en banc) (“The
conduct proscribed by the Hobbs Act is the wrongful use of public office, not merely the
acceptance of benefits.”).
81. See United States v. Aguon, 851 F.2d 1158 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
82. 500 U.S. 257 (1991).
83. Id. at 266 n.5 (“The conflict on this issue is clear, but this case is not the occasion to
resolve it.”). The district court instructed the jury that
inducement can be in the overt form of a demand, or in a more subtle form such as
custom or expectation. . . . Extortion under color of official right does not require
proof of specific acts by the public official demonstrating force, threats, or the use
of fear so long as the victim consented because of the office or position held by the
official.
Id. at 261 n.4.
84. Id. at 273.
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medicine in the state.85 While campaigning for reelection in 1984,
McCormick explained to the doctors’ representative that “his campaign was
expensive, that he had paid considerable sums out of his own pocket, and
that he had not heard anything from the foreign doctors.”86 Shortly
thereafter, McCormick received the first of five cash payments totaling
several thousand dollars, none of which he disclosed as campaign
contributions as required by West Virginia law.87
Although the Fourth Circuit ultimately upheld McCormick’s conviction,
including his violation of the Hobbs Act, it noted the difficulty inherent in
“articulating a standard” to distinguish legitimate campaign contributions
from extorted money.88 Nevertheless, the circuit court articulated seven
factors relevant to determining the legitimacy of campaign contributions.89
Based on these factors, it found that there was sufficient evidence that the
payments were extorted and, thus, that an explicit quid pro quo was not
required for a conviction under the Hobbs Act in the campaign contribution
context.90
The Supreme Court rebuked the Fourth Circuit and reversed
McCormick’s conviction.91 It held that Hobbs Act extortion under color of
official right in the campaign contribution context requires a specific quid
pro quo—a payment “made in return for an explicit promise or undertaking
by the official to perform or not to perform an official act.”92 In reaching
this decision, the Supreme Court reflected on the unique role of elections in
a democracy: “to hold that legislators commit the federal crime of extortion
when they act for the benefit of constituents . . . shortly before or after

85. Id. at 259–60.
86. Id. at 260.
87. Id.
88. United States v. McCormick, 896 F.2d 61, 65 (4th Cir. 1990), rev’d, 500 U.S. 257.
The difficultly of the decision was due in part to the Supreme Court’s decision in Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), which held that campaign contributions are a legitimate and
necessary part of democracy. See id. at 21; ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA 217
(2014) (“Creating laws that deter bribery of legislators, but do not deter democratic
organizing, has been among the most vexing problems of the American political
experiment.”).
89. McCormick, 896 F.2d at 66 (“Some of the circumstances that should be considered
in making this determination include, but are not limited to, (1) whether the money was
recorded by the payor as a campaign contribution, (2) whether the money was recorded and
reported by the official as a campaign contribution, (3) whether the payment was in cash, (4)
whether it was delivered to the official personally or to his campaign, (5) whether the official
acted in his official capacity at or near the time of the payment for the benefit of the payor or
supported legislation that would benefit the payor, (6) whether the official had supported
similar legislation before the time of the payment, and (7) whether the official had directly or
indirectly solicited the payor individually for the payment.”).
90. Id. (“[I]f payments to elected officials are not treated as legitimate campaign
contributions by either the payor or the official, then a jury may reasonably infer that these
payments are also induced by the official’s office in violation of the Hobbs Act. Otherwise,
unless there was an explicit quid pro quo promise, elected officials could avoid the Hobbs
Act merely by calling the money ‘campaign contributions.’”).
91. McCormick, 500 U.S. at 269 (“[T]he Court of Appeals’ opinion did not examine or
mention the instructions given by the trial court.”).
92. Id. at 273 (emphasis added).
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campaign contributions are solicited and received from those beneficiaries,
is an unrealistic assessment of what Congress could have meant” when it
codified Hobbs Act extortion.93
In his dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens attacked the “explicit promise”
requirement handed down by the majority.94 He argued, “Subtle extortion
is just as wrongful—and probably much more common—than the kind of
express understanding that the Court’s opinion seems to require.”95
Notably, the Court punted on two sources of circuit splits concerning the
Act: First, whether and how proof of a quid pro quo applies outside of the
campaign contribution context.96 Second, whether or not inducement on
the part of the official is a necessary element of Hobbs Act extortion under
color of official right.97
B. Evans v. United States:
Clarifying the Quid Pro Quo Standard?
Less than two weeks after it decided McCormick, the Supreme Court was
given a proverbial “second bite at the apple.” It swiftly granted certiorari to
clarify the circuit split over whether prosecutors must prove some
affirmative act of inducement, beyond holding an official office, to be
found guilty of Hobbs Act extortion—an issue it left unresolved in
McCormick.98
Petitioner John Evans was elected to the Board of Commissioners of
DeKalb County, Georgia.99 As part of an investigation into public
corruption, the FBI initiated conversations with Evans in which agents
requested that he assist in the acquisition of favorable zoning decisions.100
Evans accepted some $7,000 in cash and a $1,000 check, payable to his
campaign, from an undercover FBI agent.101 He reported the check in his
campaign finance disclosure but failed to disclose the $7,000 in cash.102
On the inducement issue, the Supreme Court sided with the majority of
circuits, holding that Hobbs Act extortion under color of official right does
not require inducement by the public official;103 the coercive element is
93. Id. at 272 (writing that “so long as election campaigns are financed by private
contributions,” any other interpretation of the Hobbs Act is untenable).
94. Id. at 282 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 268 (majority opinion) “McCormick does not challenge any rulings of the
courts below with respect to the application of the Hobbs Act to payments made . . . to
elected officials that are properly determined not to be campaign contributions.” Id. “[W]e
do not decide whether a quid pro quo requirement exists in other contexts, such as when an
elected official receiv[ed] gifts, meals, travel expenses, or other items of value.” Id. at 274
n.10.
97. Id. at 266 n.5.
98. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
99. Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 257 (1992).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 265 (“The statute merely requires of the public official that he obtain ‘property
from another, with his consent, . . . under color of official right.’”); see also Linda

2017]

WHO PUT THE QUO IN QUID PRO QUO?

1805

provided by the existence of the public office itself.104 In so holding, the
Court both imbued Hobbs Act extortion with common law extortion105 and
likened Hobbs Act extortion to bribery.106
But the Court went further than just deciding the narrow issue of
inducement; the Evans decision’s lack of clarity on the quid pro quo
requirement for Hobbs Act extortion would prove critical, as it provided
fodder for disunity in the courts of appeals.107 The majority held that
Hobbs Act extortion occurs when “the public official receives a payment in
return for his agreement to perform specific official acts; fulfillment of the
quid pro quo is not an element of the offense.”108 In the same paragraph,
however, the Court rephrased its holding, critically omitting the adjective
“specific” used earlier to describe the “official act”: the Court held that
“the Government need only show that a public official has obtained a
payment to which he was not entitled, knowing that the payment was made
in return for official acts.”109
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence muddies the quid pro quo waters by
embracing, or at least lending support for, the majority’s nonspecific
holding regarding official acts. Critically, Justice Kennedy wrote that the
official and the payor “need not state the quid pro quo in express terms, for
otherwise the law’s effect could be frustrated by knowing winks and
nods.”110 In addition, Justice Kennedy makes clear something that the
majority did not: that “the rationale underlying the Court’s holding [that
quid pro quo is an element of Hobbs Act extortion] applies not only in
campaign contribution cases, but in all § 1951 prosecutions.”111 This
statement would be clearer if the majority, concurrence, or dissent had
overtly discussed the case’s unique mix of personal and campaign
contributions.112 Because none of the opinions discussed the implications
of this mix, the extent to which the decision is applicable to situations not
involving campaign contributions is murky.113 The language and concerns
Greenhouse, Court Upholds Widened Use of U.S. Extortion Law, N.Y. TIMES (May 27,
1992), http://www.nytimes.com/1992/05/27/us/court-upholds-widened-use-of-us-extortionlaw.html [https://perma.cc/L8AG-FX4N].
104. Evans, 504 U.S. at 265.
105. Id. at 263 (“Although the present statutory text is much broader than the commonlaw definition of extortion because it encompasses conduct by a private individual as well as
conduct by a public official, the portion of the statute that refers to official misconduct
continues to mirror the common-law definition.”).
106. Id. at 260 (describing Hobbs Act extortion under color of official right as the “rough
equivalent of what we would now describe as ‘taking a bribe’”).
107. See infra Part II.C.
108. Evans, 504 U.S. at 268.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 274 (second emphasis added) (“The inducement from the official is criminal if
it is express or if it is implied from his words and actions, so long as he intends it to be so
and the payor so interprets it.” (emphasis added)).
111. Id. at 278.
112. See id. at 257–58 (stating that the defendant was given $7,000 in cash and a $1,000
campaign contribution by check).
113. See, e.g., United States v. Giles, 246 F.3d 966, 971–72 (7th Cir. 2001) (discussing
whether Evans applies outside the campaign contribution context); United States v. Hairston,
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expressed in Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion have had a lasting effect
on quid pro quo standards and have led to a battle of interpretations by the
lower courts over which “holding” in the majority opinion should be
applied.114
In the twenty-page dissent—three pages longer than the majority opinion
itself—Justice Thomas, joined by Justices William Rehnquist and Antonin
Scalia, argued that Congress did not intend to codify common law extortion
“under color of official right” when it passed the Hobbs Act in 1946.115
Justice Thomas also expressed serious federalism concerns116 and reiterated
that McCormick’s holding was “expressly limited” to the campaign
contribution context.117
Thus, disagreement within the courts of appeals on Hobbs Act extortion’s
quid pro quo requirement could be predicted from the Evans opinion itself.
The majority’s position—embracing both “official acts” and “specific
official acts”—lacked clarity.118 Justice Kennedy’s concurrence declared
that a quid pro quo must be proven in all Hobbs Act extortion cases but that
the promise to perform need not be “express.”119 And Justice Thomas’s
dissent suggested the majority extended McCormick’s specific quid pro quo
requirement to all cases of Hobbs Act extortion.120
C. Circuit Confusion over the Hobbs Act’s Extortion
Quid Pro Quo Requirement After Evans v. United States:
What Does “Official Act” Mean?
Due to the uncertain scope of the Supreme Court’s decision in
McCormick and its fractured opinion in Evans, confusion over whether and
when Hobbs Act extortion requires specific official acts was inevitable.
Two issues developed: (1) whether Evans requires a quid pro quo as an
element of Hobbs Act extortion outside of the campaign contribution
context and (2) assuming it does, whether McCormick’s requirement that
the quid pro quo be specific applies only in the campaign contribution
context.

46 F.3d 361, 365 (4th Cir. 1995) (noting that Evans “required proof of a quid pro quo
because it involved campaign contributions” (emphasis added)).
114. See infra Part II.C.
115. Evans, 504 U.S. at 281 (“[T]he critical inquiry for our purposes is the American
understanding of the crime at the time the Hobbs Act was passed in 1946.”).
116. Id. at 290.
117. Id. at 287 (“[W]e do not decide whether a quid pro quo requirement exists in other
contexts, such as when an elected official receives gifts, meals, travel expenses, or other
items of value.” (quoting McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 274 n.10 (1991))).
118. See supra notes 107–09 and accompanying text.
119. Evans, 504 U.S. at 274.
120. Id. at 287 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Today’s extension of McCormick’s . . . quid pro
quo limitation to all cases of official extortion is both unexplained and inexplicable . . . .”).
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1. Is a Quid Pro Quo Showing Required
in All Hobbs Act Extortion Prosecutions?
Immediately following Evans, a number of courts of appeals questioned
whether any quid pro quo showing was necessary to prove Hobbs Act
extortion outside the campaign contribution context. As recently as 2001,
for example, the Third Circuit held that Supreme Court precedent “does not
require a quid pro quo for extortion outside the context of campaign
contributions.”121
In United States v. Blandford,122 Judge David Nelson of the Sixth
Circuit, in a concurring opinion, struggled to understand the effect of
McCormick and Evans outside the campaign context.123 After surveying
the cases, he concluded that “[e]ven outside the campaign contribution
context . . . the quid pro quo requirements can be satisfied only where the
payment has been accepted in exchange for a ‘specific’ official act or a
‘specific’ requested exercise of official power.”124 In reaching this
conclusion, Judge Nelson noted that there was “no reason to doubt that the
‘official acts’ referred to in the last sentence [of Evans] were the ‘specific
official acts’ referred to earlier.”125 Thus, it was unclear from the beginning
how these cases should be interpreted and applied in various situations.126
2. Most Courts of Appeals Adopt a Two-Tiered Approach
to the Quid Pro Quo Requirement
Over time, the courts of appeals relied on Justice Kennedy’s “winks and
nods” concurrence as sufficient authority to find that Evans established a
relaxed standard outside the campaign contribution context, even though

121. United States v. Antico, 275 F.3d 245, 258 (3d Cir. 2001); see also Jarrett, supra
note 61, at 213 (“One advantage of the Hobbs Act is that the prosecution need not prove that
the public official performed an official act as a quid pro quo for the property given to the
public official.”).
122. 33 F.3d 685 (6th Cir. 1994).
123. Id. at 713 (Nelson, J., concurring).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See id.; see also United States v. Tucker, 133 F.3d 1208, 1215 (9th Cir. 1998)
(holding that the Supreme Court had not decided the quid pro quo question outside of the
campaign context, and assuming without deciding that a quid pro quo was required in all
Hobbs Act extortion prosecutions); United States v. Hairston, 46 F.3d 361, 365 (4th Cir.
1995) (holding that although the Supreme Court’s decisions did not resolve the issue, a quid
pro quo must be proven in all Hobbs Act extortion cases); United States v. Davis, 30 F.3d
108, 109 (11th Cir. 1994) (reiterating that “an explicit promise by a public official to act or
not act is an essential element of Hobbs Act extortion”); United States v. Martinez, 14 F.3d
543, 552–54 (11th Cir. 1994) (reversing Hobbs Act extortion conviction where trial court
erroneously interpreted Evans and McCormick as requiring a quid pro quo jury instruction
only in “instances of extortion under color of official right involving campaign
contributions”).
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proof of a quid pro quo is always necessary.127 In United States v.
Garcia,128 the Second Circuit described this view succinctly:
Although the McCormick Court has ruled that extortion under color of
official right in circumstances involving campaign contributions occurs
“only if the payments are made in return for an explicit promise or
undertaking by the official to perform or not to perform an official act,”
Evans modified this standard in non-campaign contribution cases by
requiring that the government show only “that a public official has
obtained a payment to which he was not entitled, knowing that the
payment was made in return for official acts.”129

Using this analysis, most courts of appeals have developed standards of
implicit quid pro quo outside the campaign context.130 Known as the
“stream of benefits” or “as opportunities arise” theory, this implicit standard
does not require the contemplation of a specific official action at the time
the agreement is made.131 For this reason, the stream of benefits theory has
been criticized for “invit[ing] slippage” from a quid pro quo standard to a
“‘one hand washes the other’ or ‘favoritism’ standard.”132
The Second Circuit detailed the approach in United States v. Ganim.133
In an opinion written by then-Judge Sotomayor, the court upheld the
conviction of the former Mayor of Bridgeport, Connecticut, who accepted
payment in return for an agreement to secure the payor a government
contract.134 Ganim challenged the jury instruction, which provided that
“[t]he government does not have to prove an explicit promise to perform a
particular act made at the time of payment.”135 Instead, the district court
instructed that “it is sufficient if the defendant understood he was expected
as a result of the payment to exercise particular kinds of influence . . . as
specific opportunities arose.”136 The court reiterated that such a standard is
the “natural corollary of Evans’ pronouncement that the government need
not prove the existence of an explicit agreement at the time a payment is
received.”137 Indeed, the court found that the defendant’s proposed
definition of “official act”—something “identified and directly linked to a
benefit at the time the benefit is received”—went too far.138 Critically, the
127. United States v. Garcia, 992 F.2d 409, 414 (2d Cir. 1993); see also United States v.
Giles, 246 F.3d 966, 971–72 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Taylor, 993 F.2d 382, 385 (4th
Cir. 1993).
128. 992 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1993).
129. Id. at 414 (first quoting McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 273 (1991); then
quoting Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 268 (1992)).
130. See George D. Brown, Applying Citizens United to Ordinary Corruption: With a
Note on Blagojevich, McDonnell, and the Criminalization of Politics, 91 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 177, 218–19 (2015).
131. Id. at 217.
132. Albert W. Alschuler, Criminal Corruption: Why Broad Definitions of Bribery Make
Things Worse, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 463, 481 (2015).
133. 510 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2007).
134. Id. at 137–38.
135. Id. at 144 (quoting United States v. Coyne, 4 F.3d 100, 114 (2d Cir. 1993)).
136. Id. (quoting Coyne, 4 F.3d at 114).
137. Id. at 145 (citing Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 268 (1992)).
138. Id.
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court understood the term “official act” to mean “an act taken under color
of official authority, not necessarily as the term is used and statutorily
defined in . . . § 201 or elsewhere.”139 The Fourth Circuit, in United States
v. Jefferson,140 relied on Ganim in holding that bribery, including Hobbs
Act extortion, “can be accomplished through an ongoing course of
conduct.”141
In United States v. Abbey,142 the Sixth Circuit noted that “not all quid pro
quos are made of the same stuff” and thus, outside of the campaign
contribution context, “the elements of extortion are satisfied by something
short of a formalized and thoroughly articulated contractual
arrangement.”143 The court justified this implicit quid pro quo standard by
noting that “there is no reason to impose a judicial requirement . . . that
would make it lawful under the Hobbs Act to pay a public official to exert
his influence in your favor, so long as it is premature for the agreement to
contemplate specific acts.”144 Thus, the court held that “it is sufficient if
the public official understood that he or she was expected to exercise some
influence on the payor’s behalf as opportunities arose.”145
Lastly, the Ninth Circuit has held a conviction for extortion under color
of official right, whether in the campaign or noncampaign contribution
context, requires that the government prove a quid pro quo.146 In the
noncampaign contribution context, however, “[a]n explicit quid pro quo is
not required; an agreement implied from the official’s words and actions is
sufficient to satisfy this element.”147
As these cases demonstrate, despite the confusion surrounding the
meaning of Evans and McCormick, a majority of the courts of appeals have
coalesced around a two-tiered quid pro quo standard in which the quo
component of the quid pro quo is relaxed outside the campaign contribution
context.
III. SECTION 666: QUID PRO QUO?
While the preceding discussion helps to explain how courts understand
bribery and quid pro quo as they relate to Hobbs Act extortion, a brief
139. Id. at 142 n.4. In so doing, the court rejected the defendant’s argument that the
Supreme Court’s holding in United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California, 526 U.S.
398 (1999), should apply to Hobbs Act extortion or federal funds bribery. For a more
thorough discussion of these cases distinguishing § 666 from the Court’s analysis in SunDiamond, see Jared W. Olen, The Devil’s in the Intent: Does 18 U.S.C. § 666 Require Proof
of Quid-Pro-Quo Intent?, 42 SW. L. REV. 229, 251–54 (2012).
140. 674 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2012).
141. Id. (quoting Ganim, 510 F.3d at 149). After Governor McDonnell’s trial, the district
court relied on Jefferson in upholding the jury instruction. United States v. McDonnell, 64 F.
Supp. 3d 783, 793 (E.D. Va. 2014), aff’d, 792 F.3d 478 (4th Cir. 2015), vacated, 136 S. Ct.
2355 (2016).
142. 560 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2009).
143. Id. at 517–18.
144. Id. at 518.
145. Id. (emphasis added).
146. See United States v. Kincaid-Chauncey, 556 F.3d 923, 937 (9th Cir. 2009).
147. Id.
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detour into the text and judicial construction of § 201 bribery is necessary
before we can make sense of the § 666 case law.148 Part III.A discusses the
relevant background on § 201. Next, Part III.B explores those courts that
have found § 666 to require proof of a quid pro quo. Then, Part III.C
discusses those courts that have held that § 666 requires no quid pro quo
showing.
A. A Brief Detour into the Federal Bribery Statute: § 201
As previously stated, Hobbs Act extortion’s quid pro quo requirement
has been defined by the Supreme Court with reference to the term “official
act,”149 whereas § 666 makes no mention of “official act” or of a quid pro
quo requirement more generally.150 Because § 201 provides a detailed
statutory scheme, has had the benefit of time and several Supreme Court
interpretations, and encompasses bribery just like § 666, cases interpreting
§ 201 are used by litigants and the courts to help understand both § 666 and
Hobbs Act extortion.151
Section 201 criminalizes the receipt of bribes for those “acting for or on
the behalf of the United States.”152 Thus, unlike § 666, § 201 is not
applicable to state and local officials. The statute defines “official act” as
“any decision or action on any question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or
controversy, which may at any time be pending, or which may by law be
brought before any public official, in such official’s official capacity, or in
such official’s place of trust or profit.”153
Relying on the Supreme Court’s decisions in Evans and McCormick and
the implicit quid pro quo standard for Hobbs Act extortion that followed,
some courts in the 1990s construed § 201 as requiring only a weak quid pro
quo that could be satisfied “so long as the evidence shows a ‘course of
conduct of favors and gifts flowing to a public official in exchange for a
pattern of official actions favorable to the donor.’”154 The Supreme Court
put this interpretation to rest in United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of
California.155 In a decision that mentioned neither Evans nor McCormick,
148. One commentator has noted that “the Hobbs Act . . . and § 666 have swallowed
§ 201” and thus, they should require the same state of mind. Gawey, supra note 46, at 419.
As this Note explores, this statement may oversimplify a complex issue. See infra Part V.
149. See supra notes 108–09 and accompanying text.
150. See supra note 58.
151. See e.g., United States v. Ganim, 510 F.3d 134, 146 (2d Cir. 2007) (noting that SunDiamond should be limited to § 201 because that statute’s specific text—“‘for or because of
any official act’—led the Court to conclude that a direct nexus was required to sustain a
conviction under § 201” (quoting United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S.
398, 406 (1999))); United States v. Ford, 435 F.3d 204, 210 & n.2 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that
§ 666 and § 201 “differ[] in significant respects,” including that “Section 201 lacks an
explicit intent requirement as to recipients of alleged bribes while Section 666 contains
one”).
152. 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(1) (2012).
153. Id. § 201(a)(3).
154. United States v. Jennings, 160 F.3d 1006, 1014 (4th Cir. 1998) (quoting United
States v. Arthur, 544 F.2d 730, 734 (4th Cir. 1976)); see Garcia, supra note 76, at 239–43.
155. 526 U.S. 398 (1999).
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Sun-Diamond primarily resolved a question regarding § 201’s treatment of
bribery and gratuities.156 The lower court instructed the jury that “[t]he
government need not prove that the alleged gratuity was linked to a specific
or identifiable official act or any act at all.”157
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia analyzed § 201’s definition of
“official act.”158 The Court concluded that “for bribery there must be a
quid pro quo—a specific intent to give or receive something of value in
exchange for an official act.”159 Thus, the Court held that within the
meaning of § 201, an “official act” requires “that some particular official
act be identified and proved.”160 While potentially applicable to all
antibribery statutes,161 the decision can also be read more narrowly to apply
only to § 201.162
After Sun-Diamond, defendants argued with success in some circuits that
a quid pro quo requirement should apply in § 666 cases as well.
B. Circuits Requiring a Quid Pro Quo in § 666 Prosecutions
The Second,163 Fourth,164 Eighth165, and Eleventh166 Circuits have found
that § 666 requires at least an implicit “stream of benefits” quid pro quo.167
In United States v. Jennings,168 the Fourth Circuit analyzed the “corrupt
intent” requirement under § 666 by referring to § 201.169 Invoking the
Supreme Court’s differentiation between illegal bribes and illegal gratuities
in Sun-Diamond, the Fourth Circuit held that a bribe under § 666 requires
proof of payment made in exchange for an official act.170 It concluded that
the “corrupt” element in § 666 requires the government to prove a
“relatively specific quid pro quo”171 but stated that the “quid pro quo
156. See id. at 404.
157. Id. at 413–14.
158. Id. at 404.
159. Id. at 404–05.
160. Id. at 406.
161. See Gawey, supra note 46, at 415 & n.208.
162. See Sun-Diamond, 526 U.S. at 414 (“We hold that, in order to establish a violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(A), [the gratuity provision,] the Government must prove a link
between a thing of value conferred upon a public official and a specific ‘official act’ for or
because of which it was given.”). Courts have held “that Sun-Diamond [does not] require[]
us to define the crime of bribery narrowly [because it] says nothing about bribery.” United
States v. Alfisi, 308 F.3d 144, 151 n.4 (2d Cir. 2002).
163. United States v. Ganim, 510 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2007).
164. United States v. Jennings, 160 F.3d 1006 (4th Cir. 1998).
165. United States v. Redzic, 627 F.3d 683, 692 (8th Cir. 2010) (relying on Ganim and
Jennings, and upholding a § 666 conviction because “an illegal bribe may be paid with the
intent to influence a general course of conduct” and the government need not “link any
particular payment to any particular action”).
166. United States v. Siegelman, 640 F.3d 1159, 1171 (11th Cir. 2011) (applying Evans
and McCormick to § 666 and holding that an “official must agree to take or forego some
specific action in order for the doing of it to be criminal under § 666”).
167. See supra Part II.B.2.
168. 160 F.3d 1006 (4th Cir. 1998).
169. Id. at 1012–13.
170. Id. at 1013.
171. Id. at 1020 n.5.
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requirement is satisfied so long as the evidence shows a ‘course of conduct
of favors and gifts flowing to a public official in exchange for a pattern of
official actions favorable to the donor’” and “the intended exchange in
bribery can be ‘this for these’ or ‘these for these,’ not just ‘this for that.’”172
In Ganim, the Second Circuit similarly held that § 666 bribery requires a
quid pro quo173 but found that, like Hobbs Act extortion, it “can be
accomplished through an ongoing course of conduct, so long as evidence
shows that the ‘favors and gifts flowing to a public official [are] in
exchange for a pattern of official acts favorable to the donor.’”174
C. Circuits with No Quid Pro Quo Requirement
At present, a number of courts of appeals do not require proof of a quid
pro quo to be convicted of § 666 federal bribery.175 In United States v.
Abbey,176 the Sixth Circuit examined the text of § 666 and determined that
it “says nothing of a quid pro quo requirement to sustain a conviction,
express or otherwise.”177 In doing so, the court approved of the Second
Circuit’s analysis in Ganim, to the extent that “Sun-Diamond’s heightened
[(i.e., explicit)] quid pro quo standard is inapplicable to . . . § 666 [because
it is a] markedly different statute[].”178
In United States v. Garrido,179 the Ninth Circuit agreed that the need for
a limiting principle—which drove the Supreme Court’s analysis in SunDiamond with respect to § 201—is not present with respect to § 666,
“because § 666 contains both a corrupt intent requirement and a
requirement that the illegal gift or bribe be worth over $5,000.”180
Moreover, unlike § 201, the plain text of § 666 “makes no mention of an
‘official act’ or a requirement that anything be given in exchange or return
for an official act.”181 Thus, because § 666 “does not define or even use the
term ‘official act,’”182 it “does not require a jury to find a specific quid pro
quo.”183
In United States v. McNair,184 the Eleventh Circuit similarly discovered
that “nothing in the plain language of [§ 666] requires that a specific
172. Id. at 1014 (quoting United States v. Arthur, 544 F.2d 730, 734 (4th Cir. 1976)).
173. United States v. Ganim, 510 F.3d 134, 151–52 (2d Cir. 2007).
174. Id. at 149 (quoting Jennings, 160 F.3d at 1014); see also United States v. Rosen, 716
F.3d 691, 699–700 (2d Cir. 2013).
175. See Olen, supra note 139, at 244–45 (arguing that the plain language of § 666
impliedly requires proof of a quid pro quo).
176. 560 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2009).
177. Id. at 520 (“By its terms, [§ 666] does not require the government to prove that
Abbey contemplated a specific act when he received the bribe.”).
178. Id.
179. 713 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 2013).
180. Id. at 1001.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 996; see also United States v. Gee, 432 F.3d 713, 714–15 (7th Cir. 2005)
(holding that while proof of a quid pro quo is sufficient to prove a violation of § 666, it is not
necessary).
184. 605 F.3d 1152 (11th Cir. 2010).
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payment be solicited, received, or given in exchange for a specific official
act.”185 The court held that § 666 does not require “that the government
allege or prove an intent that a specific payment was solicited, received, or
given in exchange for a specific official act, termed a quid pro quo.”186
Therefore, the government need only prove that the recipient had “an intent
to corruptly influence or to be influenced ‘in connection with any business’
or ‘transaction’” of the applicable government or agency.187
Thus, the division between the circuit courts on the issue of whether the
text of § 666 requires prosecutors to prove a quid pro quo, including an
“official act,” is apparent. Whether, and to what extent, McDonnell will
impact future Hobbs Act extortion and § 666 prosecutions requires an
analysis of that case, its facts, and its procedural posture.
IV. MCDONNELL: CLARITY ON HOBBS ACT EXTORTION
QUID PRO QUO REQUIREMENT?
Having discussed the trajectory of the Court’s interpretation of Hobbs
Act extortion and § 666 quid pro quo requirements, the importance of the
central issue in McDonnell’s prosecution—the meaning and reach of
“official act” as applied to the former governor’s Hobbs Act extortion
conviction—is clear.
A. Virginia Governor Received More Than $175,000
from Pharmaceutical CEO
Former Governor Bob McDonnell began his political career in Virginia’s
House of Delegates, where he served for nearly fifteen years.188 Beginning
in 2006, McDonnell served as the state’s attorney general.189 Following a
successful tenure in that position, McDonnell was elected governor of
Virginia in 2009.190 McDonnell’s campaign for governor focused on
economic development and stressed the theme “Bob’s for jobs.”191

185. Id. at 1187–88.
186. Id. at 1188.
187. Id.
188. Kristi Oloffson, 2-Minute Bio: Virginia Governor-Elect Bob McDonnell, TIME
(Nov. 4, 2009), http://content.time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,1934361,00.html [https://
perma.cc/R5HD-LLHC].
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Editorial, McDonnell Speech: Bob’s for Jobs, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH (Aug. 30,
2012, 1:00 AM), http://www.richmond.com/news/article_4c9ab80a-f434-5710-8856-7ac46
818ea93.html [https://perma.cc/AV7S-U7TK]. McDonnell’s first act as governor was to
sign an executive order establishing a commission on job creation. This executive order
broke with thirty years of tradition in which the governor’s first act had been to issue an
executive order banning discrimination in state employment. See Rosalind S. Helderman,
Virginia Governor’s Anti-Bias Order Removes Language Regarding Sexual Orientation,
WASH. POST (Feb. 10, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/
02/09/AR2010020903739.html [https://perma.cc/D8FB-3YY5].
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During his campaign for governor, McDonnell used the private plane of
Jonnie Williams, the CEO of Star Scientific, Inc.192 Star Scientific was
evaluating the efficacy of a drug—anatabine—that it “wanted the Food and
Drug Administration to classify . . . as a pharmaceutical.”193 After his
election, Governor McDonnell met Williams for dinner to thank him for his
generosity during the campaign.194 At dinner, Williams ordered a $5,000
bottle of cognac and offered to purchase Mrs. McDonnell a custom Oscar
de la Renta dress for the inauguration.195 Williams proceeded to purchase
her $20,000 in clothes and continued to allow them use of his jet.196
In May of 2011, Williams loaned the McDonnells $65,000 to service
their debt and to help pay for their daughter’s wedding reception.197 The
next day, Williams covered a $2,380.24 bill incurred by Governor
McDonnell, his sons, and his future son-in-law at a Virginia golf club.198 In
June, Williams sent a letter to McDonnell in which he “suggest[ed] that
[McDonnell] use the attached protocol to initiate the ‘Virginia study’” of
Star Scientific’s new drug at the Medical College of Virginia and the
University of Virginia—both state universities.199
Over the course of the summer, Williams bought the governor a new set
of golf clubs and allowed the governor’s family use of his vacation home,
Range Rover, and Ferrari.200 Shortly after the vacation, McDonnell
“directed” the Commonwealth’s Secretary of Health to have his deputy
attend a meeting about Star Scientific’s new drug at the governor’s
mansion.201 Later that month, Williams purchased a $6,000 Rolex watch
that he gave to the governor.202 The pattern of meetings, loans, and gifts
continued through 2012, by which time Williams had spent more than
$175,000 on Governor McDonnell and his family.203
B. Criminal Prosecution
On January 21, 2014, the governor and his wife were indicted on
fourteen counts, including charges of honest services fraud and Hobbs Act
extortion under color of official right.204 At trial, McDonnell’s Hobbs Act
extortion conviction hinged on the meaning of “official act” (i.e., whether
the governor took money that was not due to him for the performance of his

192. United States v. McDonnell, 792 F.3d 478, 487 (4th Cir. 2015), vacated, 136 S. Ct.
2355 (2016).
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 488.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 489.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 490.
203. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2364.
204. Indictment, supra note 27, at 33–41.
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official duties).205 In accordance with Fourth Circuit precedent, which
allows for “stream of benefits” implicit quid pro quo,206 the district court
instructed the jury that “an official action is no less official because it is one
in a series of steps to exercise influence or achieve an end.”207 The trial
court proceeded to define “official action” as applicable to the Hobbs Act
extortion charge.208 The jury instruction drew heavily from § 201.209
McDonnell challenged the jury instruction.210 In denying McDonnell’s
renewed motion for judgment of acquittal, the district court found that the
“most basic definition” of “official act” is found with reference to § 201, the
federal bribery statute.211 The court proceeded to reference Jennings, a
§ 666 case that held that the quid pro quo requirement is satisfied “so long
as the evidence shows a course of conduct of favors and gifts flowing to a
public official in exchange for a pattern of official actions favorable to the
donor.”212 Thus, although the trial court accepted the parties’ agreement
that “official act” should be understood with reference to § 201’s definition,
the court reiterated that “all that must be shown is that payments were made
with the intent of securing a specific type of official action or favor in
return.”213
The district court acknowledged, however, the concern that “mere
‘[i]ngratiation and access’ may not alone create a quid pro quo
agreement.”214 The distinction, the court found, is in the defendant’s
subjective intent.215 The court pointed to five specific actions taken by
McDonnell on behalf of Star Scientific on an “as opportunities ar[i]se”
basis to support the quo component of the implicit quid pro quo standard216:
(1) “arranging meetings for [Williams] with Virginia government officials,
who were subordinates of the Governor, to discuss and promote
205. See United States v. McDonnell, 64 F. Supp. 3d 783, 788 (E.D. Va. 2014), aff’d, 792
F.3d 478, vacated, 136 S. Ct. 2355.
206. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
207. McDonnell, 792 F.3d at 506.
208. Id. (noting that the trial court defined “official action” for purposes of honest
services fraud, which “appl[ies] equally to the definition of official action for the purposes
of” Hobbs Act extortion).
209. Id. at 505–06 (“The term official action means any decision or action on any
question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding, or controversy, which may at any time be pending,
or which may by law be brought before any public official, in such public official’s official
capacity. Official action as I just defined it includes those actions that have been clearly
established by settled practice as part of a public official’s position, even if the action was
not taken pursuant to responsibilities explicitly assigned by law. . . . In addition, official
action can include actions taken in furtherance of longer-term goals, and an official action is
no less official because it is one in a series of steps to exercise influence or achieve an
end.”).
210. McDonnell, 64 F. Supp. 3d at 787.
211. Id. at 788.
212. Id. at 789 (quoting United States v. Jennings, 160 F.3d 1006, 1014 (4th Cir. 1998));
see supra notes 168–74 and accompanying text.
213. McDonnell, 64 F. Supp. 3d at 789.
214. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 360
(2010)).
215. Id.
216. Id. at 791.
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Anatabloc”; (2) “hosting, and the defendants attending, events at the
Governor’s Mansion designed to encourage Virginia university researchers
to initiate studies of anatabine and to promote Star Scientific’s products to
doctors for referral to their patients”; (3) “contacting other government
officials in the [Governor’s Office] as part of an effort to encourage
Virginia state research universities to initiate studies of anatabine”; (4)
“promoting Star Scientific’s products and facilitating its relationships with
Virginia government officials by allowing [Williams] to invite individuals
important to Star Scientific’s business to exclusive events at the Governor’s
Mansion; and” (5) “recommending that senior government officials in the
[Governor’s Office] meet with Star Scientific executives to discuss ways
that the company’s products could lower healthcare costs.”217
C. McDonnell Appeals His Conviction to the Fourth Circuit
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit began by reviewing United States v.
Birdsall218 and Sun-Diamond, two Supreme Court cases involving the
definition of “official act.”219 Birdsall, the court explained, “stand[s] for
the proposition that an ‘official act’ ‘may include acts that a [public servant]
customarily performs, even if the act falls outside the formal legislative
process.’”220 The Fourth Circuit read Sun-Diamond as dictating merely that
“job functions of a strictly ceremonial or educational nature will rarely, if
ever, fall within” § 201’s definition of “official act”—it “did not rule that
receptions, public appearances, and speeches can never constitute ‘official
acts’ within the meaning of § 201(a)(3).”221 Thus, the court found that
§ 201’s definition of official acts “is broad enough to encompass the
customary and settled practices of an office, but only insofar as a purpose or
effect of those practices is to influence a ‘question, matter, cause, suit,
proceeding or controversy’ that may be brought before the government.”222
Thus, the stage was set for McDonnell’s appeal to the Supreme Court over
whether the district court and Fourth Circuit had faithfully applied Supreme
Court precedent and properly analyzed the official acts jury instruction.
D. The Supreme Court’s Opinion
The Supreme Court began its analysis by noting that the theory
underlying both the honest services wire fraud charge and the Hobbs Act
extortion charge “was that Governor McDonnell had accepted bribes from
Williams.”223 Critically, the Court also acknowledged that the jury
instruction given for “official action” was made with reference to § 201’s
definition as had been agreed upon by the parties in the early stages of the
217. Indictment, supra note 27, at 34–35.
218. 233 U.S. 223 (1914).
219. McDonnell, 792 F.3d at 506–09.
220. Id. at 507 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Jefferson, 674 F.3d 332,
356 (4th Cir. 2012)).
221. Id. at 508.
222. Id. at 509.
223. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2365.
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litigation.224 As such, the Court dove into the statutory construction of
§ 201.225
The Court stated that § 201’s “official act” requirement has two
components: the government must (1) “identify a ‘question, matter, cause,
suit, proceeding or controversy’ that . . . ‘may by law be brought’ before a
public official” and (2) “prove that the public official made a decision or
took an action ‘on’ that question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding, or
controversy, or agreed to do so.”226 Applying noscitur a sociis,227 the rule
against superfluity,228 and its decision in Sun-Diamond, the Court found
that although “merely setting up a meeting, hosting an event, or calling
another official”229 does not qualify as an official action, such action “could
serve as evidence of an agreement to take an official act.”230 While the
action “must . . . be something specific and focused,” the official “need not
specify the means that he will use to perform his end of the bargain,” “[n]or
must [he] in fact intend to perform the ‘official act,’ so long as he agree[d]
to do so.”231 Finally, the Court held, the action “may include using his
official position to exert pressure on another official to perform an ‘official
act.’”232
The Court bolstered its analysis by discussing three constitutional
concerns weighing in favor of a more “bounded interpretation of ‘official
act’”233: (1) too broad a reading could improperly intrude on legitimate
relationships between elected officials and their constituents,234 (2) a broad
reading raises fair notice and due process concerns,235 and (3) a broad
reading raises federalism concerns over the extent to which federal
prosecutors should police the conduct of state and local officials.236 These
constitutional concerns are in tension with Congress’s power to regulate,
and the Supreme Court’s acknowledgement that preventing quid pro quo
corruption, as well as the appearance of such corruption, is a compelling
government interest.237

224. Id.
225. Id. at 2368.
226. Id.
227. Id. (“[A] word is known by the company it keeps” (quoting Jarecki v. G.D. Searle &
Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961))).
228. Id. at 2369 (“If ‘question’ and ‘matter’ were as unlimited in scope as the
Government argues, the terms ‘cause, suit, proceeding or controversy’ would serve no role in
the statute.”).
229. Id. at 2370.
230. Id. at 2371.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 2372.
233. Id. at 2368.
234. Id. at 2372.
235. Id. at 2373.
236. Id.
237. See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1445 (2014); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 27 (1976).
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In making reference to Evans, the McDonnell Court conspicuously chose
to embrace the “specific official acts” language,238 rather than the broader
“official acts” language relied on by many circuit courts in establishing the
implicit quid pro quo standard outside the campaign contribution context.
The Court also reiterated that Hobbs Act extortion includes “taking a
bribe.”239
Thus, notwithstanding that the case revolved around construction of
§ 201 and can be read not to apply in cases where § 201’s definition is not
invoked, McDonnell provides that to fulfill the quid pro quo requirement,
the quo (i.e., the official act) need not be explicit, but it must be “specific
and focused.”240 Moreover, the prosecuted official need not specify the
“means that he will use to perform” the official act, nor must he actually
fulfill the official act so long as he agrees to do so.241 This raises the
question: Does the implicit quid pro quo standard of “stream of benefits” or
“as opportunities arise” survive the decision? And if so, does McDonnell
sound the end of the implicit quid pro quo standard in all bribery
prosecutions or only Hobbs Act extortion and honest services wire fraud—
the two statutes at issue in the case?
V. POSSIBLE INTERPRETATIONS OF MCDONNELL BY THE LOWER COURTS
AND THEIR EFFECT ON FUTURE FEDERAL PROSECUTIONS
OF STATE AND LOCAL CORRUPTION
Prior to McDonnell, the following framework was in place: § 666 federal
bribery could, in some circuits, be proven without a quid pro quo
showing;242 Hobbs Act extortion could, in most circuits, be proven with an
implicit “stream of benefits” quid pro quo if the alleged bribe was not
received in the course of a campaign;243 and § 201 bribery always required
There are three plausible judicial
an explicit quid pro quo.244
interpretations of McDonnell that can help shed light on how the decision
will affect the existing framework going forward.
A. Courts May Interpret McDonnell Broadly
to Apply to All Federal Antibribery Statutes,
Including Both Hobbs Act Extortion and § 666 Bribery
To avoid the constitutional concerns raised in McDonnell, lower courts
may err on the side of caution and read the language in McDonnell as
broadly requiring a specific quid pro quo for all theories of bribery,
including § 666 and Hobbs Act extortion. In United States v. Pomrenke,245
238. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2365 (citing Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 268
(1992)).
239. Id.
240. Id. at 2372.
241. Id. at 2371.
242. See supra Part III.C.
243. See supra Part II.C.2.
244. See supra notes 159–60 and accompanying text.
245. No. 1:15CR00033, 2016 WL 4074116 (W.D. Va. Aug. 1, 2016).
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the District Court for the Western District of Virginia denied defendant’s
motion for a judgment of acquittal based on the McDonnell decision.246
Despite the fact that “[t]he issue in the McDonnell decision was ‘the proper
interpretation of the term “official act” as used in 18 U.S.C. § 201,’”247 the
court applied the McDonnell definition in upholding defendant’s § 666
conviction.248
But this view is constrained to those circuits, like the Fourth Circuit in
which the Western District of Virginia resides (and in which McDonnell’s
prosecution took place), that require a quid pro quo in § 666 prosecutions
and define the quo component as an “official action.”249 Absent that link,
the Supreme Court’s analysis of the meaning of “official act” in SunDiamond and McDonnell is less obviously applicable to § 666. Those
courts of appeals that do not require a quid pro quo showing in § 666
prosecutions250 would have to overturn existing circuit precedent and hold
that the language of § 666 does require proof of a quid pro quo—including
an official act—despite the absence of such express requirements in the text
of § 666 and McDonnell’s silence regarding § 666.
This interpretation has the advantage of uniformity but is unlikely to be
widely adopted in the absence of a more express statement by the Supreme
Court.
B. Courts May Interpret McDonnell as Requiring
a Specific Quid Pro Quo in Hobbs Act Extortion Prosecutions
but Not in § 666 Prosecutions
The trial courts may reasonably apply the McDonnell definition of
“official act” to Hobbs Act extortion prosecutions but not to § 666
prosecutions. Congress knows how to require quid pro quo, and it knows
how to define “official act.” One commentator has noted that “[e]quating
the language of § 666 with that in § 201(b) . . . ignores the textual
differences” that exist between the statutes.251 Section 666 covers those
who “influence or reward,”252 while § 201(b) covers only those transactions
intended to “influence . . . official acts.”253 Applying § 201’s quid pro quo
standard to § 666 without the textual support to do so flies in the face of the
rule against superfluous language.254 Moreover, as then-Judge Sotomayor

246. Id. at *46.
247. Id. at *44 (quoting McDonnell v. United States, 136 U.S. 2355, 2367 (2016)).
248. Id.
249. See United States v. Rosen, 716 F.3d 691, 700 (2d Cir. 2013); United States v.
Jennings, 160 F.3d 1006, 1014 (4th Cir. 1998); supra Part III.C.
250. See supra Part III.C.
251. Mark S. Gaioni, Federal Anticorruption Law in the State and Local Context:
Defining the Scope of 18 U.S.C. § 666, 46 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 207, 235 (2012).
252. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 666 (2006)).
253. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)).
254. See id. But see Stephanie G. VanHorn, Taming the Beast: Why Courts Should Not
Interpret 18 U.S.C. § 666 to Criminalize Gratuities, 119 PENN ST. L. REV. 301, 324 (2014)
(noting that the current version of § 666 more closely mirrors § 201, and, therefore, the same
meaning should be applied to both statutes).
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noted in Ganim, to define “official act” in the context of Hobbs Act
extortion and § 666 as something “identified and directly linked to a benefit
at the time the benefit is received” goes too far.255
An additional argument in favor of the view that the McDonnell Court’s
construction of § 201 “official act” should not be read into the text of § 666
is that § 201 itself contains two statutory alternatives to the official act
requirement.256 By its terms, § 201 does not require the prosecuted official
to have corruptly received something of value in return for an official act to
be guilty of § 201 bribery.257 In the alternative, a federal officer may be
charged with corruptly receiving something of value in return for “being
influenced to commit . . . any fraud . . . on the United States”258 or “being
induced to do or omit to do any act in violation of [his or her] official
duty.”259 If McDonnell is found to apply to all future Hobbs Act extortion
and § 666 cases, the courts should consider these alternatives, which appear
to undercut the force of the reasoning in McDonnell.
Because of the facial textual differences, the existing circuit precedent
distinguishing § 666 from § 201, and the lack of specificity by the Court in
terms of the opinion’s applicability, this is the likely construction of
McDonnell, particularly in those circuits that do not require a quid pro quo
showing in § 666 prosecutions.
C. Courts May Treat the McDonnell Decision Like Sun-Diamond
and Decline to Apply the Court’s Statutory Interpretation of § 201
“Official Acts” to Hobbs Act Extortion or § 666 Bribery
The lower courts could decline to apply McDonnell to future Hobbs Act
extortion prosecutions on the grounds that the opinion is distinguishable on
its facts and procedural history. As discussed, the parties agreed to define
“official acts” with reference to § 201—a decision that the Court accepted
but did not hold is necessary in future prosecutions.260 This interpretation
would mark a continuation of the position taken by several courts of
appeals in declining to extend the Sun-Diamond clarification of § 201
“official acts” to § 666.261 The position is especially strong with respect to
§ 666 because that statute was not at issue in the case and the Court did not
mention it. Viewed in this light, McDonnell may prove to be little more
than a reiteration of past precedent.

255. United States v. Ganim, 510 F.3d 134, 145 (2d Cir. 2007).
256. See 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2)(B)–(C) (2012).
257. Id.
258. Id. § 201(b)(2)(B).
259. Id. § 201(b)(2)(C).
260. See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
261. See e.g., United States v. Garrido, 713 F.3d 985, 1001 (9th Cir. 2013) (noting that
§ 666 “sweeps more broadly” than § 201 and that “[b]ecause the plain language of § 666
does not use the term ‘official act,’ we must not insert that term into our reading of the
statute”); United States v. Abbey, 560 F.3d 513, 521 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Sun-Diamond’s
heightened quid pro quo standard is inapplicable to both the Hobbs Act and [§ 666]” because
Sun-Diamond “concerned a markedly different statute” than either the Hobbs Act or § 666).
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Shortly after the Supreme Court decided McDonnell, Sheldon Silver, the
former Speaker of the New York State Assembly, applied to have the
Southern District of New York grant him bail while his case was on
appeal.262 Silver was found guilty of, among other things, committing
honest services fraud and Hobbs Act extortion under color of official
right.263 Although the court granted Silver’s request, it noted that
McDonnell “did not hold that section 201(a)(3) . . . necessarily had to be the
source for the definition of official action . . . in the quid pro quo
requirements of . . . extortion under color of official right.”264 The court
went on to explain that “[i]n beginning its analysis, the [Supreme] Court
incorporated the federal bribery statute’s definition of official act into the
bribery requirement for . . . [Hobbs Act] extortion without explaining why it
was doing so.”265 Thus, while § 201’s “official act” definition was
sufficient to pass constitutional muster, “the [Supreme] Court did not
address whether a different definition . . . could likewise allay the Court’s
constitutional concerns.”266
If this rationale is accepted by the Second Circuit on appeal, it seems
likely that prosecutors will continue to “exercise [their] prerogative to
prosecute [Hobbs Act extortion and honest services fraud] without any
reference to Section 201’s now-narrow definition of ‘official acts.’”267 In
an opinion without precedential effect, however, the Second Circuit has
hinted that it may apply McDonnell’s requirement of a specific quid pro
quo to all Hobbs Act extortion and honest services wire fraud prosecutions
but was silent as to § 666 because the defendant was not charged with that
crime.268
Thus, there are three possible interpretations of the opinion, each with its
own set of advantages and drawbacks. As discussed below, courts should
adopt a bounded interpretation of McDonnell to avoid creating unnecessary
and polarizing division between Hobbs Act extortion and § 666.
VI. IN DEFENSE OF A BOUNDED INTERPRETATION OF MCDONNELL
A broad interpretation of McDonnell, consisting of its application of a
specific official act in all Hobbs Act and § 666 bribery cases, is appealing in
many ways. Because § 666 criminalizes virtually the same behavior as
Hobbs Act extortion, the same governance, federalism, and due process
concerns that motivated the Court in McDonnell should apply equally to
262. See United States v. Silver, No. 15-CR-093 (VEC), 2016 WL 4472929 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 25, 2016).
263. Id. at *1.
264. Id. at *6 n.8.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. See Eli J. Richardson, Attorneys React to High Court’s Political Bribery Ruling,
LAW360 (June 27, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/811259/attorneys-react-to-highcourt-s-political-bribery-ruling [https://perma.cc/XHA9-YJLT].
268. See United States v. Halloran, No. 15-2351(L), 2016 WL 6128039, at *4 (2d Cir.
Oct. 20, 2016) (applying McDonnell’s “official act” standard to uphold Hobbs Act extortion
conviction).
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§ 666. Such a construction would provide uniformity in jury instructions
and a common meaning of bribery that might help with constitutional notice
and due process concerns. A broad interpretation would also ensure that
whatever constitutional concerns exist over the infringement of states’
rights by federal prosecutors are limited and clearly defined. A broad
application of McDonnell also has the benefit of minimizing the federal
government’s intrusion into the relationships between state and local
officials and their constituents.
Moreover, a broad application of McDonnell squares with the proposition
that the Court is attempting to overcome the statutory differences and create
uniformity.269 In addition to McDonnell arguably creating a quid pro quo
standard applicable to all federal bribery theories, the Court recently ruled
in Ocasio v. United States270 that a civilian bribe payor—not just the bribed
official—could be prosecuted for and convicted of conspiracy to commit
extortion “under color of official right.”271 This ruling dismantles a critical
distinction that existed between § 666 and Hobbs Act extortion in some
circuits. Despite these benefits, such an interpretation is untenable given
the existing bribery framework.
A. The Problems Inherent in Applying McDonnell
to Hobbs Act Extortion but Not to § 666
Limiting McDonnell to its facts and narrowly construing it to apply only
to § 201 is preferable to creating a dichotomy between Hobbs Act extortion
and § 666, in which the former requires a quid pro quo with a specific
official act, and the latter (in some circuits) requires only corrupt intent with
no quid pro quo requirement at all. Because of the unique procedural
posture of the case, where the litigants “agreed” they would define the
“official act” element of Hobbs Act extortion with reference to § 201,272
distinguishing the case in much the same way as the Ganim Court
distinguished Hobbs Act extortion from Sun-Diamond273 should be
relatively straightforward.
If courts are to take this position, they must adequately address the
constitutional concerns raised by McDonnell. This can be accomplished
short of requiring a specific quid pro quo in every Hobbs Act extortion and
§ 666 prosecution. By weighing the due process, federalism, and notice
concerns expressed by the Court, lower courts can adopt jury instructions to
ensure that prosecutions stay within constitutional bounds.
Before the lower courts read McDonnell to apply more broadly, the
Supreme Court should first resolve the existing problematic circuit split

269. See Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 411 (2010) (narrowing the range of
criminal behavior subject to honest services wire fraud, in part, to “establish[] a uniform
national standard”).
270. 136 S. Ct. 1423 (2016).
271. Id. at 1436.
272. McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2365 (2016).
273. See United States v. Ganim, 510 F.3d 134, 145 (2d Cir. 2007).
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over whether § 666 requires proof of a quid pro quo.274 Absent such
clarification, a more onerous standard for proving Hobbs Act extortion will
do very little because § 666 is more than capable of filling the void and
effectively relegating Hobbs Act extortion to only the most clear-cut
instances of state and local bribery.
In the interim, before the Court is able to resolve the § 666 circuit split,
there are benefits of a lower quid pro quo standard worth considering.
Corrupt public officials and those who corruptly provide them with things
of value do not carry out their business in an open and explicit way:
oftentimes there is an “I’ll scratch your back if you scratch mine
agreement,” negotiated with so-called “winks and nods.”275
Whatever the legitimate policy and constitutional concerns weighing
against continuation of the implicit quid pro quo standard, it should be
noted that soon after Governor McDonnell’s conviction, the Virginia
legislature amended its disclosure laws and lowered the threshold for
accepting gifts from $250 to $100 to help solve the “Johnnie Williams
problem.”276 In just the few months before that law went into effect, the
number of lawmakers who reported accepting gifts in excess of fifty dollars
dropped by 15 percent.277
B. The “Stream of Benefits” Quid Pro Quo Standard
Is Worth Protecting Until the Supreme Court
Issues a More Definitive Statement on Its Continued Existence
As Justice Stevens understood when he wrote his dissenting opinion in
McCormick, subtle forms of extortion and bribery are “just as wrongful—
and probably much more common—than the kind of express
understanding” that McDonnell seems to envision.278
This
acknowledgement was repeated again a year later by Justice Kennedy,
when he wrote in Evans about the inadequacy of an explicit quid pro quo
standard to root out corruption facilitated by “knowing winks and nods.”279

274. See Gaioni, supra note 251, at 211 (noting that defining § 666 with reference to
§ 201 is “problematic”).
275. See Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 274 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
276. Davis C. Rennolds, Let’s Get Ethical, a Look at the New Ethics Reform in the
Commonwealth of Virginia, 19 RICH. J.L. & PUB. INT. 1, 11 (2015) (quoting Max Smith,
Virginia General Assembly Passes New “Gift” Laws in Response to McDonnell Scandal,
WTOP (Feb. 28, 2015, 1:10 PM), http://www.wtop.com/virginia/2015/02/virginia-generalassembly-passes-tough-new-gift-laws-in-response-to-mcdonnell-scandal/ [https://perma.cc/
UN7E-DEKG]).
277. See Patrick Wilson, Virginia State Lawmakers Accept Fewer Gifts Than a Year Ago,
VIRGINIAN-PILOT (Aug. 17, 2016), http://www.pilotonline.com/news/government/virginia/
virginia-s-state-lawmakers-accept-fewer-gifts-than-a-year/article_f3111903-4378-598b8a63-0802e60e9891.html (“Lawmakers acknowledge their behavior has changed following
the indictment, trial and conviction of McDonnell in a scandal involving more than $170,000
in gifts and off-the-books loans from a businessman seeking state assistance.”)
[https://perma.cc/C5Q6-RK6C].
278. McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 282 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
279. Evans, 504 U.S. at 274 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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Beyond clarifying the meaning of “official act” as codified in § 201 and
applied in McDonnell’s prosecution, the Court in McDonnell impliedly
sanctioned the former governor’s actions and laid a blueprint for would-be
corrupt state and local politicians to sell their influence for personal
pecuniary gain. Before the lower courts open the floodgates and allow such
activity to occur unchecked by the federal government, they should
interpret the McDonnell opinion holistically and seek to understand it in the
context of the cases that have come before it.
Understanding McDonnell not to apply to § 666 is natural, especially in
those courts of appeals with no § 666 quid pro quo requirement. Because
applying McDonnell to Hobbs Act extortion is avoidable, the lower courts
should take that course of action. To do otherwise would be to judicially
repeal Hobbs Act extortion and render the very real and serious
constitutional concerns raised in McDonnell meaningless. Section 666
would still persist, and Hobbs Act extortion prosecutions would, practically
speaking, cease to exist.
C. An Illustration: What If McDonnell Was Re-charged
with Committing § 666 Bribery Instead of Hobbs Act Extortion
and Federal Funds Bribery?
As discussed in the introduction of this Note, the U.S. Attorney’s Office
for the Eastern District of Virginia declined to re-charge the former
governor.280 This result is unsurprising in light of the Fourth Circuit’s
Jennings decision.281 Because that court interpreted § 666 with reference to
§ 201 and the Supreme Court’s decision in Sun-Diamond, it held that a quid
pro quo, including an official act, is required to prove § 666 federal
bribery.282
Had McDonnell been charged in a state within the Sixth, Ninth, Seventh,
or Eleventh Circuits, however, prosecutors would not be required to prove
any official act to convict him of § 666 federal bribery.283 The government
and the courts would, therefore, have a strong basis on which to re-charge
Governor McDonnell on the same facts without running afoul of the
McDonnell decision because it made no mention of § 666. Of course,
McDonnell could be interpreted broadly to require proof of a specific
official act in all bribery cases, including § 666 cases. But because
McDonnell was charged with committing honest services wire fraud and
Hobbs Act extortion, the underlying assumption of the case was that “[t]o
convict the McDonnells of bribery, the Government was required to show
that Governor McDonnell committed (or agreed to commit) an ‘official act’
in exchange for the loans and gifts.”284 In those courts of appeals that do

280.
281.
282.
283.
284.

See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
See supra Part III.B.
United States v. Jennings, 160 F.3d 1006, 1013 (4th Cir. 1998).
See supra Part III.C.
McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2361 (2016).
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not require proof or a quid pro quo in § 666 prosecutions, the analysis that
follows from that assumption is largely inapplicable.
Instead, a court would merely have to satisfy itself that McDonnell had
“an intent to corruptly influence or to be influenced ‘in connection with any
business’ or ‘transaction’”285 related to the Virginia government and that
such a showing does not run afoul of the broad constitutional concerns
raised in McDonnell. In the Eleventh Circuit, for example, the court
specifically held that although “many § 666 bribery cases will involve an
identifiable and particularized official act, . . . [it] is not required to
convict.”286 Thus, given the current framework of federal antibribery
statutes, the disunity among the courts of appeals regarding the quid pro
quo standard for bribery can be expected to grow if McDonnell is not
limited to its facts and procedural posture.
CONCLUSION
A broad application of McDonnell as applied to future Hobbs Act
extortion and § 666 prosecutions must be rejected in favor of a more limited
reading that allows the courts and prosecutors to develop constitutionally
acceptable alternatives to grafting § 201’s “official act” definition onto the
Hobbs Act and § 666. Doing so will not run afoul of the Constitution,
because practical alternatives to the § 201 definition exist. Applying a more
limited reading of McDonnell will also prevent further disunity among the
circuits in prosecuting bribery by state and local officials. Moreover,
failure to do so will likely result in the demise of the “stream of benefits”
implicit quid pro quo standard, which was developed to prevent the most
pernicious and undetectable forms of corruption undertaken by
sophisticated parties to the detriment of the taxpaying public.

285. See, e.g., United States v. McNair, 605 F.3d 1152, 1188 (11th Cir. 2010).
286. Id.

